Volume 42
Issue 3 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 42,
1937-1938
4-1-1938

Judgment-Proof Wealth
Alfred F. Conard

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Alfred F. Conard, Judgment-Proof Wealth, 42 DICK. L. REV. 119 (1938).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol42/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

Dickinson Law Review
VOLUME

XLII

APRIL, 1938

NUMBER

3

JUDGMENT-PROOF WEALTH
A

STUDY OF SOME DEFICIENCIES IN PENNSYLVANIA
ATTACHMENT EXECUTIONS

Alfred F. Conard*
Property visibly existing and notoriously owned was the foundation of our
early law. Where its shadows fell we drew the outlines of our law of judgment
and execution. Property which we would today call intangible was lumped
with the tangible, and a ground rent might be sold in like manner with the
land itself, on a fieri facias.1
When wealth in the fugitive forms of bank deposits, corporate stocks, rights
to redeem pledges, and miscellaneous things in action arose in the mists, we
called them personal property. They were to have no peculiar immunities, and
we declared firmly that
"the plaintiff in every judgment

.

.

.

may have execution

upon the personal estate of the defendant."2
Lest there be any misunderstanding, we specifically stated that stocks, deposits
and debts should share liability to the creditor's attack.
The trend away from the tangible forms of property known to the forward-looking legislators of 1836 continued and accelerated. In 1880, the percentage of our national wealth represented by bank deposits, cash surrender
values of insurance policies, and stocks and bonds was 16. In 1933 it was 34.
A.B., Grinnell College (Iowa), 1932; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1936.
Member of Pennsylvania Bar. Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law, University of
Missouri, 1937-1938.
1Shollenberger v. Filbert, 44 Pa. 404 (1863), assuming the validity of a sale on execution
of a ground rent levied in 1786.
2
(Pa.) Act of 1836, June 16, P.L. 755, sec. 19 (12 Purd. St. 2111).

3lbid. at sec. 22 (12 Purd. St. 2113).
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The proportion represented by liquid insurance had increased more than fortyfold. 4 The man of property had become a man of intangible property.
The law, as usual, did not keep up with the facts. A review of it will
suggest that the defendant who does not pay may as readily be one who will
not as one who can not.
Likely enough, the defendant is comfortably supported by the income of
sound Philadelphia mortgages. If so, every one may be security for the bond
of a mortgagor long since disappeared, or of a straw mortgagor who has signed
ten thousand such mortgages, and now draws a minimum wage from a trust
company. The owner of the property today, presumably a responsible person,
has not guaranteed or assumed the debt.
According to the preWhat can the plaintiff gain by legal process?
vailing formula of attachment execution,
"If the garnishee owes the judgment debtor nothing, or has in his
possession no money or property belonging to the latter, the attachment falls." 5
If the plaintiff garnishees the straw mortgagor, he will "recover" nothing
but judgment, for the straw will not and cannot pay.
Will the plaintiff be any better off if he summons as garnishee the responsible owner who makes the semi-annual interest payments? This mere owner of
the land, subject to the encumbrance, "owes the judgment debtor nothing," and
"has in his possession no money or,property belonging to the latter." With
respect to this valuable and extensive form of private wealth, attachment appears
6
ineffective.
It is almost unnecessary to add that a levy upon the bond, warrant and
mortgage, if the defendant has generously disclosed their location, will give
the plaintiff no additional assistance. A bond or single bill is not subject to
execution, and although the sheriff seize it and sell it publicly in the presence
of the acquiescing debtor, the title is not divested from him. 7 Of course a garnishment summoning the bank in whose vault the defendant has his safety deposit box, filled with valuables, is not even plausible with regard to this type of
security."
Although the creditor is unfortunate whose debtor possesses only mortgages, he is as well off as if his debtor owned stocks. It is practically impossible,
4A. A. Berle and V. J. Pederson, LIQUID CLAIMS AND NATIONAL WEALTH (1934).
6
Fisher, for use, v. McFarland, 110 Pa. Super. 184, 186-7, 167 At. 377 (1933).
6Ibid.
7
Rhoads v. Megonigal, 2 Pa. 39 (1845); Aarons v. Public Service B. & L. Ass'n, 318 P,..
113, 115, 178 At!.141 (1935).
8Williams v. Ricca, 324 Pa. 33, 187 At!.722 (1936).
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as Professor Amram has shown, to execute upon a corporate share unless the
shareholder, the certificate, and the corporation are cozily domiciled in the same
jurisdiction. 9 If the corporation is not subject by the law of its domicil to the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 10 its shares are absolutely free from execution in
any other jurisdiction. The common law that foreign corporate shares are nonattachable is not abrogated by execution statutes not expressly applying to such
2
such
shares. If, as reasoned in Christmas v. Biddle," and Cherkasky v. Pride,"
a share is beyond the jurisdiction of any but the domiciliary state, statutes cannot
vary the rule under any circumstances.
If the corporate domicil chooses to embody the share in the certificate under
the uniform act, it will become subject to seizure;13 but in practice the law is impotent to deal with such readily concealed objects. Even if it is not concealed,
the defendant need only put the certificate in his pocket to enjoy a complete immunity. 14 The embodiment of the share in the certificate does nothing to bring
the issuing corporation within the state to be summoned as garnishee.
The Uniform Stock Transfer Act does not aid the only practicable form
of execution on shares, that is, garnishment, but impedes it. Whereas it might
have been possible in its absence effectively to garnishee the corporation in the
jurisdiction of its domicil, it is now necessary to seize the share or enjoin its
transfer.' 5 The difficulty of seizure has been discussed. The requirement of a
bill in equity to enjoin transfer of the certificate will usually require a proceeding in a state or county other than that of the attachment, since corporate
domicils are so frequently removed from shareholders' domicils.. Naturally the
separate proceedings in the different jurisdictions must be timed precisely together, in order to prevent the effecting of a transfer by the party last served.
The expense of such proceedings will certainly be disproportionate to ordinary
collection claims. Even when the corporation garnishee and the debtor are in
different counties of the same state, our laws will not permit the process of one
county to be served in the other. 16 Before the requirements of the uniform act,

OAmram, ATTACHMENT EXECUTION (1936) Phila. Bar Ass'n Sem. Ser. 5-7; see also
Note, The Situs of Stock for the Purpose of Attachment (1937) 85 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 522.
10(Pa.) Act of 1911, May 5, P.L. 126 (15 Purd. St. 301-324.)
1113 Pa. 222 (1850).
1210 D. & C. 133 (C.P. 4 Phila. Co., Pa. 1928).
1SRestatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) Sec. 53.
14 (Pa.) Act of 1836, June 16, P.L. 755, sec. 25 (12 Purd. St. 2117), provides that money
shall not be taken from the defendant's person. In fact, the sheriff will not levy on any property which may be, and is, similarly carried.
5
1 Uniform Stock Transfer Act, (Pa.) Act of 1911, May 5, P.L. 126, sec. 13 (15 Purd. St.
313); Cherkasky v. Pride, 10 D. & C. 133, 135 (C.P. 4 Phila. Co., Pa. 1928), cited note 12,
supr-a.

s16Krollick v. Husway, 29 D. & C. 252
Super. 284, 194 At. 306 (1937).

(Pa. 1937); cf. Eldredge v. Eldredge,

128 Pa.
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as interpreted, it was sufficient if the court had jurisdiction of the garnishee, and
the chose, for the defendant, if outside the county, could be ignored. 17 The unfortunate complainant might well appeal from the inadequacy of the equitable
remedy now required, to the more flexible justice of the law!
The debtor so conservative as to own mortgages evidently presents problems. So does the debtor so daring 'as to own stocks. What of the ideal defendant - the one with accounts receivable, including bank accounts? If he
chooses to remove his property from the clutch of the law, he need only (knowing the exact balance in the account, if in a bank)18 assign it an instant before
the writ is served (and/or be able to prove that he has done so) in order
to defeat his creditor. If his intimation that an attachment was on the way was
a false herald, he will be spared embarrassment, since h-e need have given the
bank or other obligor no notice of the assignment. 19 The assignment is valid
against the attaching creditor even though it would be invalid if questioned
by the garnishee for non-compliance with its rules regulating transfer of
claims; 20 and although the assignor continued after the purported assignment
21
to bill the debtor and receive payments on account.
The vice in this state of the law is mitigated by the fact that the assignment must be for value, and in good faith on the part of the assignee.22 Perhaps, therefore, the hasty assignments which are effected do no worse than prefer
one creditor over another; in the absence of perjury, they would seem to offer
2
no escape except when there is a leak in the prothonotary's or sheriff's office, 3
or a well-timed premonition.
Perfectly honest banks and depositors may conspire to create another deceptive situation. A business man establishes a checking account by borrowing from a commercial bank on a demand note. On this account he can draw
checks for theater and steamship tickets; his credit is good for all checks in reasonable amounts, and he may permit a credit agency to verify his statement that
he maintains a substantial bank balance. The account is not- under joint control, and the bank has reserved no right to dishonor checks not in themselves
endangering credit. It may be assumed that the unheralded calling of the note,
17(Pa.) Act of 1845, Mar. 20, P.L. 188, sec. 4 (12 Purd. St. 1335).
ISEshenbaugh's Estate, 114 Pa. Super. 341, 174 At. 809 (1934).
19Phillips Estate, 205 Pa. 525, 55 Atd. 216 (1903); Jarecki v. Hart, 5 Pa. Super. 422
(1897); Guarantee Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. Tye, 196 At. 618 (Pa. Super. 1938), dictum.
These cases dealing with debts in general, would seem equally applicable to a bank account.
2OAuto B. & L. Ass'n v. Hall, 117 Pa. Super. 104, 177 Al. 581 (1935).
21Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Stewart Silk Co., Inc., 22 D. & C. 280 (C. P. Northampton
Co., Pa. 1934).

22Golder v. Bogash, 325 Pa. 449, 188 Al. 837 (1937).
23A gratuity may promote speed and secrecy. Does this illustrate the maxim that equity will
not aid a volunteer?
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just in time to dishonor a substantial check for club dues would lose the bank
a client, and might even subject it to a suit for malicious injury to credit. 2 '

But let an attachment ex-ecution be served, and the note may be called at
once, closing the account with a debit balance. 26 This is the equitable doctrine
of set-off, and is said to follow from the bank's power of calling the note.
No doubt it is understood among banks and business men that no complaint will be made of a calling of the note which prevents paying an existing
creditor, but does no injury to credit with prospective ones. The understanding
or practice permits calling a note when the payment of a judgment debt is
threatened, but will not permit it when a check is presented. The plaintiff may
well conclude that the diligence favored by the law is the diligence of debtors,
not creditors.
The writer will be the last to suggest that a partnership is a device for escaping creditors; but it offers its hazards in the creditors' steeplechase, if the judgment runs against an individual partner. While the partnership creditor may levy
upon and sell the goods and chattels of the firm, the individual creditor has no
right against them, 26 or against the firm bank account, 27 and can at most sell only
the defendant's interest in the partnership. Even this power was doubted, 28 and
one may well ask how a levy can reduce to the sheriff's possession a right which
is neither a chattel nor a hereditament, but a right to share in surplus and profits. 9
When its validity was established by statute, 0 the levy left the creditor almost as
far from his destination as when he started, for he has no right to control the
firm property; the privilege he has gained is to go into chancery for an account8
ing. '
The dubious levy is now supplanted, 2 by the charging order of the uniform
24

See Huffcut, LIABILITY OF A BANK TO THE MAKER OF A CHECK FOR THE
WRONGFUL DISHONOR THEREOF (1902) 2 Col. L. Rev. 193; Note, Liability of Bank
to Drawer for Negligent Dishonor of Check (1930) 30 Col. L. Rev. 126.
2
6Duffy v. 58th & Chester Ave. B. & L. Ass'n, 325 Pa. 127, 189 At. 307 (1937), af'g
122 Pa. Super. 113 (1936); Aarons v. Public Service B. & L. Ass'n, 318 Pa. 113, 178 At.
141 (1935), overruling Valiant v. Pleasanton, 108 Pa. Super. 197, 164 AtI. 143 (1932), aff'd,
311 Pa. 587, 167 At. 330 (1933).
26
Uniform Partnership Act, (Pa.) Act of 1915, Mar. 26, P.L. 18, sec. 25 (59 Purd. St. 72).
27
Toal v. Beatty, 24 D. & C. 257 (C.P. Montg. Co., Pa. 1935); cf. Lightner v. Corbet
24 D. & C. 388 (C.P. Berks Co., Pa. 1935).
28By Justice Gordon, in Richard v. Allen, 117 Pa. 199, 205, 11 At. 552 (1887).
29Uniform Partnership Act (Pa.) Act of 1915, Mar. 26, P.L. 18, sec. 26 (59 Purd. St. 73).
30(Pa.) Act of 1873, April 8, P.L. 65, sec. 1.
SIRichard v. Allen, 117 Pa. 199, 11 At. 552 (1887); Crane, PARTNERSHIP (1938)
159-160; (Pa.) Act of 1873, cited note 30, supra.
32The Act of 1873, cited notes 30 and 31, supra, was expressly repealed by (Pa.) Act of

1915, Mar. 26, P.L. 18, sec. 45. The repeal would be implied; semble, First Nat. Bank v. White,
268 Ill. App. 414 (1932).
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act. 33 Since it is an equity proceeding, and normally employs a receiver,84 it probably offers inexpensive and speedy justice with the facility of a corporate reorganization. Although it has been held that the charging order may be obtained
on a mere rule to show cause, 35 the decision fails to explain how this procedure
can give the court jurisdiction over the other partners, so as to prevent their paying
him, before the rule is made absolute, the value of his interest, or their recognizing an assignment for value.
Garnishment ought to be the direct and convenient weapon for applying
to the defendant's obligation what he is entitled to as a partner, but technical
rules obstruct its use. If the partnership account is unsettled, attachment does
not lie, because the interest in surplus and profits is not a "debt." 6 Where the
garnishee proceeded to pay the defendant cash in settlement of th'e claim of a
partnership balance, this sum was not bound by the attachment if a mere compromise of the claim without admitting the existence of a balance. 37 In the
dickering between the defendant, claiming to be a partner, and the garnishee,
denying it, it was the former who was most interested that all offers should be
"without prejudice"!
It seems from the older decisions that the sheriff must
serve his writ in the happy interval between agreement as to the sum due, and
3
payment of it.8
The plaintiff has been taking a shot in the dark in some of the situations so
far considered. In the nature of things, he did not know much beyond a rumor
about the defendant's stocks, bonds, bank account or partnership; he was subject
to the vicissitudes of fact, and we need shed no tears because he met vicissitudes
of law as well.
But there are situations in which the ownership of property, and its probable value, are forced into the open. When the defendant is owed money by
a company in receivership, the plaintiff is not relegated to guess work. He may
'examine the records, which tell him on the one hand whether anything is owed
the defendant, and on the other, how much the defendant's claim is probably
worth. The receiver or personal representative is an officer of the court, charged
with the duty of preventing fraud upon creditors.
The fiduciary has no duties, however, to creditors of creditors, and may
delay and obstruct them in their attempt to have paid to them what the fiduciary
is charged with paying to their defendant. Money in the hands of a fiduciary
33Uniform Partnership Act, (Pa.) Act of 1915, Mar. 26, P.L. 18, sec. 28 (59 Purd. St. 75).
4
3 See Spitzer v. Buten, 306 Pa. 556, 160 Atl. 444 (1932), and First National Bank v. White,
268 Ill.
App. 414 (1932).
35Frankil v. Frankil, 15 D. & C. 103 (C.P. 5 Phila., Pa. 1931); semble, Spitzer v. Buten,
306 Pa. 556, 160 At!. 444 (1932), cited note 34, supra.
36Knerr v. Hoffman, 65 Pa. 126 (1870); Home v. Petty, 192 Pa. 32, 43 At!. 404 (1899).
7
3 Ryon v. Wynkoop, 148 Pa. 188, 23 At!. 1002 (1892).
38Semble, Bank v. Lyons, 195 Pa. 479, 46 Atd. 70 (1900).
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of the court is in the care of the law, custodia legis, and beyond the compulsion
of process. The attachment which summons such a fiduciary as garnishee catches
nothing."9
Likewise, where the defendant's chose in action has required suit to reduce
it to possession, and the facts are therefore matter of public record, the very
fact of suit seems to put the asset beyond the plaintiff's power. In Home v.
Petty,4" it was held that a claim in suit is not bound by an attachment, unless
and until some amount is determined to be justly due the claimant. If payment
is made by way of compromise only, without an admission that it is due, it is
never bound by the pending attachment execution. 41 Such a compromise, it i:,
safe to say, will never be made by competent counsel, for it would be without
consideration. The payment of a sum admitted to be due is not consideration
42
for an agreement to forbear suit on the remainder of the demand.
An early case recognized that the right of a policy holder against a fire insurance company, after the fire, was not too shadowy a subject for the realistic writ
of foreign attachment, although counsel urged strenuously that the value of the
goods destroyed had not yet been ascertained. 43 In later decisions, it was cited
as authority by judges arriving at an opposite result, and the value of land was
found to be entirely too vague for an attachment which was admitted to act on
44
the value of personalty.
The disputed character of the claim which disqualifies it for the function
of liquidating the owner's obligations is not disproved when the party entitled
makes an assignment of it for value; 45 nor by the entry of judgment, for it may
still be appealed. If, on a later trial, it is determined to be six times as valuable
as on the first, its insubstantial character is firmly established, and an attachment
will be ineffectual. 46 Nor does it finally become attachable when the sheriff
has levied and sold, and has cold cash in his hands, for a beneficent statute then
17
protects the proceeds.'
One last form of property which enjoys a curious immunity from the artillery of execution is the bank account held by the entireties, The law starts with
the proposition that real estate held by the entireties is subject to the creditors
of neither spouse. That is a corollary of the rule that neither husband nor wife
39Home Mut, Life 1Ins. Co. v, Goldstein, 14 D. & C. 168 (C.P. 2 Phila. Co., Pa. 1930);
Gordon v. Kuemmerle, 19 D. & C. 191 (C.P. 5 Phila. Co., Pa. 1933).
40Horne v. Petty, 192 Pa. 32, 43 At. 404 (1899).
41Ryon v. Wynkoop, 148 Pa. 188, 23 Adl. 1002 (1892).
4'Restatement, Contracts (1932) sec. 76 (b).
4
3Girard Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Field & Co., 45 Pa. 129 (1863).
44Selheimer v. Elder, 98 Pa. 154 (1881); Eaton v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp., 84 F.

(2d)

364 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1936).
v. Elder, cited note 44, Jupra.
46Eaton v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp., cited note 44, supra.

45Selheimer
7

4 (Pa.)

Act of 1836, June 16, P.L. 755, sec. 25 (12 Purd St. 2117).
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can mortgage or convey it. It is based on the sound policy which creates statutory homestead rights in western states.4 8 Real property, constituting as it usually
does in such cases, the residence, gives a protection to the self sufficiency of the
individual not unlike the three hundred dollar exemption, 4" and is just as unavailable for margin calls as for paying off judgments.
The marital bank account presents no functional similarities. Entered in the
name of "John or Mary Smith," it is subject to the control, not of both, but of
either. John has the power and the privilege and probably the practice of using
all of it for personal or business purposes, yet it is deaf to the stern call of his
liabilities. 50
Jurists query the existence of law in the absence of sanctions, and Lord
Coke observed that execution of judgments is the life of the law.5 1 Why then
have our courts, as intangible wealth swallows up the domain of ownership,
rendered the process directed to choses in action progressively less effective?
It would be possible to show that some of the earlier decisions, which gave
a generous scope to attachment, looked at the general sections of the execution
laws, laying down the principle that the debtor's personal estate should be subject to process, 5 2 while the narrowing opinions directed their attention to the
particular sections, such as that allowing execution of a debt, and went into an
exegesis of "debt.'' 53 One could demonstrate also that error crept in when the
judge confused the cause of action giving rise to the foreign attachment, and
the cause of action garnished.5 4 It could be justly said that the early cases
recognizing defeat of the attaching creditor by a secret assignment dealt with
general assignments for creditors, so that they furthered rather than hindered the
object of doing justice among various claimants, 5 while later cases, favoring
assignments to specific creditors, permitted preferences. 56 There is little to be
gained, however, by purporting to expose logical errors in the reasoning of Chief
Justice Sharswood. Our time will be better spent in seeking the basic reasons
for the decisions made.
48See Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) secs. 247 et seq.
9
4 (Pa.) Act of 1849, April 9, P.L. 533, sec. 1 (12 Purd. St. 2161).
60Zeit v. Washington National Bank, 4 D. & C. 746 (C.P. Wash. Co., Pa. 1923).
5See Manning's Case, 8 Coke 94b, 97a (K.B. 1609).
S2Girard F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Field & Co., 45 Pa. 129 (1863), citing (Pa.) Act of 1836,
June 15, P.L. 551, sec. 44: "A writ of attachment.... may be issued against the real and
personal estate of any person ...." Cf. as to domestic attachment act, citeg at note 2, supra.
53Knerr v. Hoffman, 65 Pa. 126 (1870); Austin-Nichols Co. v. Union Tr. Co., 289 Pa.
341, 137 Atl. 461 (1927).
64See, for example, Selheimer v. Elder, 98 Pa. 154 (1881), purporting to follow Carland
v. Cunningham, 37 Pa. 228 (1860).
5 Watson v. Bagaley, 12 Pa. 164 (1849), per Chief Justice Gibson; Vincent v. Watson, 18
Pa. 96 (1851).
6
6 See cases cited in notes 19, 21, supra.
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Three discernible conceptions of social policy have influenced decisions obstructing execution by garnishment. First, there is the natural distaste for compensating the plaintiff at the expense of the county poor relief. This can be
seen when the court adduces more or less convincing logic against the attachment of accident and death benefits under an employees' association, 57 or life
insurance payable to the debtor's 'estate and attached during his lifetime. 58 These
situations are now covered by statute so far as the legislature has thought it
necessary, 59 but the principles enunciated in the decisions are remembered to
justify practically fraudulent transactions.

6 °
In Provident Trust Co. v. Rothman, '

the court applied the general, rather than the specific intent of tht legislature to
find an exemption for payments under a spendthrift annuity policy. Mr. Justice
Kephart has aptly said: 61 "The policy of the law, even where the rights of creditors may be adversely affected, favors the wife to whom the husband has attempted to secure the benefit of insurance upon her life."
Second, there is the conviction that law has no business meddling in the
affairs of two individuals, neither of whom has any desire to stand before the
bar. When Justice Sharswood held that the court would not enforce an accounting between defendant and garnishee, he undoubtedly had in mind the undesirability and the futility of an outsider's ordering them to litigate their differences for his benefit. In an age when most property was tangible, and garnishment was an incidental short-cut, the decision responded to the needs of
justice. When the defeat of attachment means the nullification of judgment,
as it does today, one need not suppose that the farsighted author would have
repeated it. But a characteristic opinion of Circuit Judge Buffington, refusing
attachment of an unliquidated claim declared, in 1936,
"To allow such a rule would seem to unwisely interfere with the
contracting parties from settling their differences by a new contract
or some other method out of court.''62

Thirdly, in determining the rule to govern a case not covered by settled
principles, the court will weigh the inconvenience to the creditor if he is denied
the aid of garnishment, against the inconvenience and injustice to the innocent
bystander who must be garnishee if the attachment is to be allowed. This was
57Kinsloe v. Davis, 167 Pa. 519, 31 Atl. 934 (1895).
5SDay v. N.E. Life Ins. Co., 111 Pa. 507, 4 At. 748 (1886).
69
As to fraternal association benefits, see (Pa.) Act of 1935, July 17, P.L. 1092, sec. 16
(40 Purd. St. 1066); as to insurance payable to members of family, (Pa.) Act of 1923, June
28, P.L.
884, sec. 1 (40 Purd. St. 517), and other acts.
6
OSee an unnecessary extension of the immunity of insurance in Provident Trust Co. v. Rotham,
321 Pa. 177, 183 Atd. 793 (1936).
61Bank v. Alexander, 280 Pa. 466, 471, 124 Atd. 634 (1924).
62Eaton v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp., 84 F. (2d) 364, 365 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1936).
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the balance which divided the court in Frazier v. Berg,6" where the majority of
the court held that an attachment might remain outstanding for years, yet impose
a lien on all funds coming into the garnishee's hands for the defendant during
its pendency. Mr. Justice Kephart, dissenting, protested,
"A garnishee should not be punished because he happens to be served
as a garnishee with no funds of defendant in the writ, nor should
he be placed in the position of a collection agency for the attaching
creditor."64
That the law may have a policy of enforcing judgments, peer or paramount
to the policy of protecting the fruits of thrift, and the privacy of contract relationships, was almost forgotten when some of the leading cases were decided.
Probably there was little need of its assertion. Today, however, the appellate
couits of Pennsylvania evidence a keen awareness of the importance of such an
objective.
When Frazier v. Berg6" was decided, Mr. Chief Justice Kephart, dissenting,
expressed a widely felt surprise. 66 If an attachment is served, and remains pending for two years, ruled the majority, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Schaffer,
whatever the defendant could have demanded of the garnishee during that time
became the plaintiff's. Since Pennsylvania Co. v. Youngman, 6" we may strike
out two, and read twenty. A game of blind man's buff was turned overnight
into a police dragnet. It was perfectly logical, for it could not be denied that
all the property bound by the writ under the decision was property of the defendant in the hands of the garnishee. As far as inconveniencing the bystander
is concerned, it entails no greater difficulty than the system of judgment liens
does with relation to real property.
The implications of Frazier v. Berg63 were not fully disclosed until the
decision of Kassow v. Feldman69 in 1937. An insurance policy which provided
that the company might make payment to any member of the insured's family
was in fact paid to a member, pending an attachment upon his interest. Althougi
the defendant had never had the right to demand payment, the court held that
the election to pay defendant made the money belong to the defendant so as
to be bound. The court recognized that what is property in fact must be property in law, whether or not it came within the ordinary conception of a "de .*
in 1836.
63306 Pa. 317, 159 At. 541 (1932).
641d. at 332.
65306 Pa. 317, 159 At. 541 (1932).
661d. at 332.
67314 Pa. 277, 171 At. 594 (1934).
6
SSee note 65, supra.
69125 Pa. Super. 286, 189 At. 719 (1936).
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A significant decision carrying the law even further in this direction was
Morris Resnik B. & L. Ass'n v. Barnes,70 Where an attachment was made on
shares of stock having a withdrawal value on the holder's election, the plaintiff
was held entitled to receive that value, without an election by the shareholder.
The necessity of an election was not permitted to obscure the essential nature
of the stock as property of the defendant in the hands of the garnishee.
Whiile the profession awaits a legislative housecleaning"l on the subject of
attachment execution, the pot of gold may be latent in the application of these
recent cases. If the defendant owns a good mortgage with a straw mortgagor
(the situation considered earlier in this study), Kassow v. Feldman" may help
him. Compare the real owner, who makes payments of interest, to the insurance
company under the facility of payment clause; neither has a specific duty to pay
the defendant, but if either elects to pay the defendant, he appropriates money
to him; and if an attachment is pending, the amount so appropriated must be
paid under the writ. This view of the problem does not seem to have been
3
specifically considered in Fisher v. MacFarland'
where a similar fact situation
was before the court; and if *considered was necessarily without the additional
light cast on the subject by Kassow v. Feldman.
Going back to the case in which the defendant owns stock in a foreign
corporation, Frazier v. Berg may offer an effective approach. Neither the doctrine that a share is at the corporation's domicil, nor the requirements of the
stock transfer act require service at the domicil in order to garnish dividendj
which become payable during the pendency of the attachment. They are mere
debts, 74 garnishable wherever the corporation does business, and the defendant
can be sued.75 Attachment will be far more practicable economically if it may
be so issued. As long as the attachment lies, the dividends will be payablc
into the writ, unless the share itself is fraudulently transferred. It will always
be desirable to prevent the transfer; but the difficulty will be vastly reduced when
the injunction or seizure is not a condition precedent to the validity of the
attachment, and when it may be handled, in a greater proportion of cases, in the
same county with the garnishment.
Where the property sought is a bank account, its essential mobility can not
be affected by judicial decision. But the cases of Frazier z?. Berg76 and Pennsyl70108 Pa. Super. 218, 164 Atd. 358 (1933).
71Recommended by Philip W. Amram (1936) Phila. Bar Ass'n Sem. Ser. ii.
72125 Pa. Super. 286, 189 Atl. 719 (1936).
73110 Pa. Super. 184, 167 Atl. 377 (1933).
74Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Private Corporations (1931) sec. 5322.
751f the defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court, of course the court has no
jurisdiction of the dividend of a foreign corporate share. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934)
Sec. 108.
76306 Pa. 317, 159 At. 541 (1932).
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vania Co. v Youngman77 suggest that a good deal might accumulate under the
writ before it is removed. In the cases where the plaintiff is met with the
set-off of a loan made by the garnishee bank to the defendant, and there is
reason to doubt to what extent the bank actually curtailed the defendant's credit,
the principle of Kassow v. Feldman may become applicable. The question will
not be, "What had the bank power to do with relation to the defendant's account?", but "What did it do?" If the note was called on the afternoon of the
attachment, but renewed the next morning, the bank did not in fact appropriate
the defendant's demandable deposit, and it was bound by the writ.
Where a partnership is summoned as garnishee on attachment against one
partner, and there is no admitted balance due, Frazier v. Berg offers a means
of realization. The creditor may wait until the partners choose to draw, and
claim the sum which then becomes due. This solution had already b-een reached
a year before the Frazier case. 8
The principle of Frazier v. Berg has been ingeniously applied to an interest
in distribution of a fund in the hands of a receiver. It is said that an attachment against a trustee in bankruptcy is invalid; but instead of quashing the writ,
Judge Alessandroni turned the tables on the defendant, and stayed action until
leave of the bankruptcy court had validated the service. 79 The claim having
become subject to the writ while it was pending, was bound.
The same treatment, combined with the principle of Kassow v. Feldmans O
offers a successful attack on the choses of the defendant which are in course
of suit or settlement. Where the execution defendant owns a disputed claim,
the plaintiff may serve his garnishment, and let it lie until the claim ceases to
be disputed. If a direct payment is made in settlement in the meantime, the
court should hold, as in the case cited, that the amount paid was necessarily
admitted to be due at the moment of payment, even if at no earlier time.
With regard to bank accounts by the entireties, where in fact the defendant co-tenant has power and privilege of using the whole account for his
own purposes, perhaps the rule of Morris Resnik B. & L. Ass'n v. Barnes8
may be applied. That case showed in 'effect that if the debtor can, by a particular
form of demand, rightfully obtain the property from the garnishee, the writ has
the effect of just such a demand, As applied to the bank account "by th- entireties," it would often be possible to show that the defendant had a privilege
77314 Pa. 277, 171 At. 594 (1934).
7SRankin v. Culver, 303 Pa. 401, 154 At.

701 (1931).
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Gordon v. Kuemmerle, 19 D. & C. 191 (C.P. 5 Phila. Co., Pa. 1933).
80125 Pa. Super. 286, 189 AtI. 719 (1936).
81108 Pa. Super. 218, 164 Ad. 358 (1933).
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and power to draw on the account to pay the debt. That privilege and power
82
should be equally available to the plaintiff.
The effectiveness of the proposed solutions which depend on the continuing force of an attachment depends on the alacrity with which the lien
of attachment can and will be removed. Mr. Chief Justice Kephart has protested the need of some protection for the garnishee; 83 he should not be made
an unwilling collection agency for the plaintiff, nor so fettered that he cannot
indulge in further business relations with his customer. Obviously a bank should
be permitted to have removed an attachment which would prevent its accepting
an account. 84 One who is receiving goods or services in instalments and paying
for them accordingly, should not be deprived of further performances by a
waylaying of the payments.8 5 Nor should a creditor's demand on a garnishee
who has promised the defendant board oblige him to pay the plaintiff the cash
value of it.86 The majority in the Frazier case agreed with the principle of these
decisions, but thought it was not too much to burden the garnishee with removing
the attachment in the proper case. It has apparently been assumed that as soon
as the garnishee proceeds to the disposal of the attachment, it will be removed
in dut course. 87
In at least one situation, an exception has appeared. Where the garnishee
has no proprietary interest in further dealings with the defendant, the writ will
be continued in order to make its lien effective; it was so held where the garnishee was a trustee in bankruptcy, and the assent of the bankruptcy court was
necessary to validate the attachment. 88 A garnishee against whom the execution
debtor has a negligence claim, if garnishment is at all applicable to such a case,
should be equally disqualified to allege an interest in having the attachment
discontinued; he has no valuable expectation of further relations with the claimant! There would have been no reason to permit the trustee who was garnished
in Pennsylvania Co. v. Youngman89 to remove the attachment rather than wait-

ing for the future interest to become a present one, and there was no indication
there that the garnishee could have forced the proceeding to a premature judg
ment unfavorable to the plaintiff. Nor was the result unjust in Frazier v. Berg o
82Cf. Restatement, Property (1936) Secs. 166 and 167, subjecting to creditors all that a
debtor might convey; and U.S. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Sec. 70 (a) (5), 11 U.S.C.A. 110 (a)
(a) (1937), same as to all property which bankrupt might by any means have transferred.
8
S3Frazier v. Berg, 306 Pa. 317, 332, 159 Atl. 541 (1932), 'dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Kephart.
84This point was the principal concern of Mr. Justice Kephart, cited in preceding note.
8
5See Meyer v. Pianti, 109 Pa. Super. 313, 167 Atd. 374 (1933).
8
6Peebles v. Meeds, 96 Pa. 150 (1880).
87
See Amram, rupra note 71, at 8, suggesting modes for disposing of the lien.
88
Gordon v. Kuemmerle, 19 D. & C. 191 (C.P. 5 Phila. Co., Pa. 1933).
89314 Pa. 277, 171 Atd. 594 (1930).
90306 Pa. 317, 159 Al. 541 (1932).
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as the majority recognized, to the garnishee before it, whose agency relationship
to the defendant was already subsisting at the moment of service. No case
known to the writer has gone to the point of holding that a pure windfall,
after the service of the writ, and not the result of an existing course of dealing,
was subjected to the process.
That our century-old attachment process is overdue for a rethinking and
a rewriting is already established by the common knowledge of the profession,
and the authoritative studies of Professor Amram. 91 It is reassuring to see that
we need not wait so long. The parade' of opinions limiting the effectiveness
of process has largely ceased in the appellate courts; they are alert to the urgency
of making execution effective. With equal alertness at the bar, progress need
not wait on the legislature. When it is remembered how fast the tax collectors
must run to keep their place in the race with fleeing wealth, we need not be
surprised if the pursuit of property in another field requires an unceasing
flexibility and growth in the law.
Columbia, Mo.
Alfred F. Conard.
9

1Cited note 71, supra.

